“A recipe for thought”. •. •. Fred Dretske a sketch of a “naturalistic” account of intentional mental states (a “psychosemantics”). “Thought may be intentional. View Notes – dretske from PHIL at University Of Arizona. Fred Dretske A recipe for thought Phil/Psyc Fall How do you build a thinking thing?. A question about Dretske’s idea that intentionality can be located in things outside of the mind — such as compasses, thermometers, and even.
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Trackback URL janetthomas says: Finally I should probably mention that this account of intentionality is not a form of externalism although Dretske does develop his theory into an externalist account.
Most significantly we have thoughts about external objects that are about them, but these thoughts are not caused drrtske by those objects. No keywords specified fix it.
For example, the statement I am thinking about fire-breathing dragons simply means that my thoughts are directed toward such dragons, even though they do not physically exist. History of Western Philosophy.
March 26, at 3: A sentence can be intentional yet be completely separate from intentionality and also sentences that report mental states need not be intensional Byrne n. Sign in Create an account. This is because intentionality, as presented here, is not a part of the mind, instead it is a way that we can describe or talk about the mind.
Chisholm accounts for the intentionality of thoughts through language, semantics, and mental expectation. Civil Society and its Discontents: Create a free website or blog at WordPress. We intuitively understand that there are many kinds of things that can be about other thlught, for example photographs are about their contents.
A Recipe for Thought
Fortunately, the account we have been developing requires only a small change to account for this. Are intentional mental states simply physical states?
This entry has no external links. Recently I have been considering the idea that it is only possible to determine if a system is conscious by examining how the state of the system in a given instant is connected to previous and subsequent moments, as well as the properties of the system at that moment which are all some theories consider relevant for consciousness.
Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind Physicalism in Metaphysics categorize this paper.
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Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind. Gordon Giles – – Philosophy Now Dretske also maintains a causal theory of intentionality such that mental states represent something, like tree rings represent something, and argues that the intentionality of mental states can be reduced to their evolutionary biological function.
And instead of requiring P to result in acts as if C we instead require P to result in acts appropriate to the mode of presentation as if C.
When I am thinking about something that does not exist, it has no place in the physical world. To establish his theory that intentionality is already naturalized, Dretskyp. He asserts that all of these demonstrate psychological intentionality and cannot be explained in non-psychological, nonintentional terms Chalmersp. The criterion for this primitive intentionality is that a property, P, of a system is about some feature of the world, C, if and only if the presence of P is usually caused by C.
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity. This claim can be tyought to original intentionality is sufficient for mentality, thereby making the claim have some chance of validity Byrne n.
Fred Dretske, A Recipe for Thought – PhilPapers
Like shadows on the wall that make one believe that there is a monster, they are a particular feature of our imagination.
For Chisholm intentionality cannot be naturalized because no such psychological fact can be identified with a physical fact. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use. However, Chisholm statesp. However, even Dretske asserts that bodily sensations are mental perceptions and therefore are intentional Byrne n. For Dretskep.
Fred Dretske – – Philosophical Studies 70 2: Yehudah Freundlich – – Dialogue 16 3: With the claim that intentionality is necessary for mentality it can reclpe countered with the claim that sensations are mental states that are non-intentional Byrne n. This essay will explore the claims made by Chisholm and Dretske and ascertain the validity of their arguments as to whether the all the contents of the mind are physical or mental states.